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Abstract. Conaider the durable gooda monopoly game with uniformly
distributed consumera' valuationa. Ii' the time horizon is finite, this
game generically hae s unique aubgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
When, following Coase's original idea, the finite time horizon ia divided
into auccesaively more subperioda, the limiting solution etill diaplaya
positive profits of the monopolist. When the time horison is infinite,
then the relative patience of the conaumers versus the monopoliat dr
termines whether perfect price discrimination or competitive outcomea
result. If all players are very patient, everything ia paaaible, even with
stationary strategies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Suppose an exhibition of the fine arts is on in a large town. It will
be open for several month and there is a single agency selling tickets
to the exhibition. This agency has the option to post a new price for
tickets every day, say. Residents in town may derive different utilities
from seeing the exhibits, but no potential visitor would consider seeing
the exhibition twice. In the latter sense a visit to the exhibition is a
durable good, because once you have seen the exhibits you are happier
(to a certain extend) for the rest of your life. If the town is sufficiently
isolated, there will be no new residents moving in during the months
in question. Thus, although the monopolistic ticket-agency can offer its
supply at a new price every day, there is only a single demand facing it
over the whole time horiaon. Since the experience of seeing the exhibits
cannot be resold, the ticket-agency does not have to fear competing
suppliers.
For such a situation it has been suggested by economic theory [Coase,
1972] that, it the ticket-agency could change its price every minute, say,
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then admission to the exhibition would be nearly free. In particular, if
price changes can be made almost instantaneously, the agency's profit
would be driven to zero, its competitive level.
The latter has come to be known as the Coa~e-Conjecture on durable
goods monopolies. It holds that to achieve a competitive outcome it
does not necessarily take many suppliers. Alternatively many pricing
clecisions, each based on different incentives, may suffice: Since in later
pcriods the supplier does not care anymore about profits already made,
its incentive structure changes over time such that the supplier's agents
of different periods compete against each other. Agents of later periods
will try to steal away customers from earlier agents by cutting prices
which will induce potential customers, rationally anticipating this, to
hold out. The more frequent price changes can be made, the closer to
zero (or: marginal cost) this will drive prices and overall profits.
On the other hand: How faz can the monopolist's agents of later
periods credibly cut their prices, given that, if the manouvre succeeded,
they would be in a position very much like the eazlier agents, excepi that
they do not have as many competitors in later periods? There seems
to be a puzzle here, the resolution of which requires formal analysis.
Accordingly the literature has addressed durable goods monopolies ever
since the original Coase-Conjecture.
Some variants of the Coase-Conjecture have become established as
theorems in the meantime. In particulaz, Gul, Sonnenschein, and
Wilson [1986; quoted as Gul et.al. in the sequel] have shown that on
durable monopoly markets with an infinite time horizon there exist sub-
game perfect equilibria in which the monopolist earns essentially noth-
ing, while customers achieve almost all of their reservation value as the
equilibrium payoff, provided that the uniform discount factor is suffi-
ciently high. As will be shown below, two assumptions are vital for
this result: A uniform discount factor for the seller and all potential
customers and infinitely many, short sales periods. In an earlier paper
Stokey (1981] has analysed a more specific durable monopoly market.
But, since Stokey did not model consumers explicitly as players, her
results received a proper game-theoretic foundation only by the later
results of Gul et.al.. For stationary equilibria the validity of the Coase-
Conjecture has been established even in models, where the durable good
depriciates [Bond and Samuelson, 1984]. Kahn [1986] generalises
Stokey's results by allowing for quadratic cost functions. The latter can
be viewed as a commitment devíce, because increasing mazginal costs
provide an incentive to sell constant amounts each period. Hence Kahn
can show that the monopolist makes a positive profit. Assuming commit-
ment power on the pazt of the monopolist and allowing for rationing,3
Van Cayseele [1991] derivea intertemporal price discrimination. For
the case, where marginal costs depend on market penetration Olsen
[1992] shows that, although prices may converge to marginal costs in ev-
ery period (when the period length becomes small), it stiA takes consider-
able time until the market is saturated. Bulow [1982] studies two-period
markets, where customers may rent a unit of the durableeach period and
the commodity dces not depreciate. Equivalently the monopolistic seller
may face a resale supply, the size of which depends on the monopolist's
previous sales. This setup difïers from the one employed in the present
paper, because a customer's utility from holding a unit of the commod-
ity depends on the length of the remaining time horizon. Ausubel and
Deneckere [1989; see also Ausubel and Deneckere, 1987] prove a
Folk Theorem for durable monopoly games with an infinite time hori-
zon by relaxing the restriction, used by Gul et.al., to Markov strategies.
Although they rely on subgame perfection, the infinite horizon is es-
sential for their results, as it always is for Folk Theoreme [Fudenberg
and Maskin, 1986; for a critical evaluation see: Guth, Leininger,
and Stephan, 1991]. More recently von der Fehr and Kuhn [1990]
have shown that the results of Ausubel and Deneckere [1989] depend
crucially on the continuous type space of consumers and the possibility
to vary sales prices continuously. The Coase-Conjecture dces not hold
true, when the monopolist also aupplies non-durables which are demand
related to the durable [Kuhn and Padilla, 1991]. Other related studies
are Riley and Zeckhauser (1983], who allow for individual sales offers
in a possibly long sequence of successive bilateral bargaining rounds;
Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel [1984] do not rely on constaut de-
mand, but assume new cohorts of potential customers in every period.
New cohorts of consumers each period are also allowed into the market
in Sobel [1991]. In general there seems to be some dissatisfaction in the
literature with the Coase-Conjecture as proved by Gul et.al.. And this
is despite the fact that, to the best of our knowledge, there seems to
be no attempt to study the two most obvious generalizations: Different
discount factors for the monopolist and the consumers, and a finite time
horizon with a large number of short subperiods as originally suggested
by Coase [1972].
The papers most closely related to the present one are the paper by
Gul et.al. [1986J and, although it deals with a quite different economic
problem, the paper by Sobel and Takahashi [1983]. These two papers
and their (dis-)similarities to the present approach will now be discussed
iu iuure dctail.
Gul et.al. allow for fairly general demand functions [1986, p.158], but
on the other hand restrict themselves to an infinite time horizon and the4
case of a uniform discount factor for both the monopolist and all con-
sumers. By contrast, in the present paper we use a very special lineaz
demand function, but study both finite and infinite horizon models and
allow for a different time preference of the monopolist as compared to
potential customers. Gul et.al. [1986, p.173] claim that the main restric-
tion of their setup is that all potential customers use the same discount
factor. We agree that this is a major restriction, but argue that also
the assumption of the same discount factor for the monopolist and all
potential customers is restrictive in the sense that it already rules out
many interesting economic phenomena. In particular the assumption of
a uniform discount factor obscures the fact that in general everything
between perfect price discrimination and a Coasian outcome is support-
able as a subgame perfect equilibrium (in stationary strategies) on an
infinite durable monopoly market. (For all what follows we will refer to
the infinite durable monopoly game, whenever the overall time horizon
is infinite; otherwise we refer to finite durable monopoly games.)
Because of the infinite time horizon, Gul et.al. (1986, p.1fi2] have to
rely on stationarity assumptions imposed onto the players' strategies and
they have to rule out strategies which condition on the behavior of very
small sets of consumers. By contrast we follow Coase for a large pazt of
the paper by approaching the situation with infinitely many sales peri-
ods via dividing a given time interval of finite length into successively
more subperiods of equal length. This enables us to derive restrictions
on the players' strategies from generic properties of the game (and de-
sirable game-theoretic robustness properties of behavior strategies) for
all equilibria. For the remaining part of the paper, where we investigate
the infinite game, we rely on a.~ymptotic convergence [Guth, Leininger,
and Stephan, 1991]: Rather than imposing stationarity, we study the
limit of the solution to finite games, when the time horizon approaches
infinity. This allows us to carry over properties of equilibrium strategies
derived in the finite context to the infinite horizon. Again, asymptotic
convergence seems to us a more convincing approach - from a purely
game-theoretic perspective - than ad-hoc assumptions on the players'
equilibrium strategies.
Summarizing, the model presented below ia much more special than
the one considered by Gul et.al. with respect to demand functions, but
more general with respect to the time horiaon and time preferences.
However, the validity of our approach via asymptotic convergence finds
extra support in the results generated in the present paper: We identify
a unique equilibrium for all finite games and are able to derive the limit-
ing solution, when the number of sales periods approaches infinity. This
allows us to prove an Anti-Coase-Conjecture stating that, as the number5
of subperiods within a given finite time interval approachea infinity, the
monopolist's profit does nof converge to the competitive level, but stays
positive. With fixed discount factors and an infinite number of possible
sales periods (the case corresponding to Gul et.al.) still unique solutions
can be identified via ssymptotic convergence for all interior discount
factors. But now the possible outcomes range from perfect price dis-
crimination to Coasian outcomes, depending on the nlative patience of
the monopolist as compared to consumers. With very patient players
on both sides of the market almost everything is possible. Since both
the latter Folk-Theorem-like reault and the Anti-Coase-Conjecture are
negative resulta in spirit, the non-degenerate example with the aimple
linear demand side sufficea to make the point.
The other paper closely related to our research ia Sobel and Taka-
liaslii (1983]. Although the economic context is rather different, there is
a conceptual similarity. Sobel and Takahashi study bilateral bargaining
between a potential buyer and a seller, who only has probabilistic beliefs
over the buyer's true valuation of the (single) commodity. Each period
the seller makes a price offer which the buyer can either accept or reject.
If an offer is accepted (or rejected in the last period), the game ends,
while it continues otherwise with a new price offer by the aeller. Future
payoffs are diacounted.
The similarity to the present model results, because in Sobel and Taka-
hashi's model the distribution function of the buyer's valuation plays a
similar role as the demand function in the present model. Although, due
to incomplete information on the part ofthe seller, Sobel and Takahashi's
game does not have proper subgames, they also derive the solution by
backward induction. But, as Gul et.al. and the more closely related later
work by Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985J, they approach the
infinite horizon, when the number of posaible bargaining rounds goes
to infinity. This explaina, why with infinitely many possible bargaining
rounds the seller cannot sell at all at positive prices [Sobel and Taka-
hashi, 1983, p.424]. As discusaed above, this may not hold true, if one
approaches the infinite case by chopping up a given finite time interval
into successively more periods.
Durable monopolies with finitely many salea periods are interesting
beyond their purpose to approximate the infinite game. To test for the
Co.~sc-Conjecture empirically by econometric eatimation will generate
enormous identification problems. Thus an empirical teat of the Coase-
Conjecture will require experimenta (which were, after all, the original
motivation of our research, cf. Guth and Ritzberger, forthcoming].
But experiments cannot be performed for markets with infinitely many
sales periods. It takes an inaight into finite analoguea to the price com-6
petition envisaged by Coase (1972] to experimentally test its empirical
relevance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 for-
mally defines the durable monopoly game. The core Section 3 analyses
finite horizon games and contains the Anti-Coase-Conjecture. Section 4
considers the infinite game with fixed discount factors and contains the
Folk-Theorem-like result. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2. THE MODEL
The game to be studied in the sequel is a T-stage game, 1 C T C oo.
To begin with the number of stages or periods, T, is taken finite and is
thought of as the number of subperiods, say, ~market days", within a
finite interval of time. To solve for the game with T- oo this number of
market days within a finite time interval will be increased and the limit
of the solutions, when T approaches infinity, will be studied.
The game is one between a single monopolistic supplier of a durable
and indivisible commodity, and a large number of different potential
customers, say, consumers. For the monopolist the marginal cost of
production is assumed to be constant. Let pi denote the unit profit in
period t, t- 1, ..., T, that is: period t's sales price minus the constant
marginal cost of production. In the sequel p~ will simply be called the
~irice in period t, because marginal costs caii be assumed to be zero
without loss of generality.
All the potential consumers have a"willingness to pay" or reservation
value v for one unit of the durable good, i.e. a customer wants either one
unit of the commodity or none. As with prices pt the redemption values
are normalized in the sense that they measure the difference between
a consumer's willingness to pay and the monopolist's marginal costs of
production. By neglecting consumers, whose willingness to pay is smaller
than the monopolist's marginal cost of production, it can be assumed
that 1 is the highest and 0 the lowest such value, i.e. redemption values v
for all consumers satisfy 0 C v C 1. It is assumed that for every number
v E(0, 1] there exists exactly one potential customer with reservation
value v and that this uniform distribution of reservation values over the
unit interval is common knowledge.
If xi denotes the number of units sold in period t, the monopolist's
profit, ai, in period t is given by ~r~ - p~xi. The monopolist's time
preference is given by a constant discount factor p E(0, 1), such that
the monopolist's payoff function for the game can be described by
T
nt - ~ Pt-1Pexs .
r-i7
In a subgame starting in period t , 1 the payoffs p,x, of periods r C t





Since a consumer with reservation value v will buy at most one unit,
her payoff in the case, where she never buys, can be normalized to zero.
If she does buy one unit in period t at the price pt, the payoff to the
consumer with reservation value v(referred to as consumer v) is given
by át-1(v - pt), where Á E(0, 1) is the common discount factor of
consumers. The reservation value v can be thought of as the discounted
stream of benefits to consumer v from enjoying the durable good from
period t onwards. At the price pt - v consumer v is indifferent between
buying and not buying. The payoff function uti of the potential customer
v is thus given by
( bt-1(v - pt), if v buys in t,
0, otherwise. u~-Sl
Obscrve that a consumer can buy only once and after having bought,
she can neither resell, nor participate actively in the game in any other
way.
To complete the definition of the extensive form game it remains to
specify the market process together with the information requirements.
In cvery period t, t- 1, ..., T, the monopolist moves first by setting
a price pt E[0, 1]. Then, observing the price, all potential customers,
who are still active (have not bought yet in any previous period) choose
simultaneously whether to buy or to continue waiting. At the end of the
period all decisions in period t become publicly known. Since perfect
recall is assumed, any player in any period knows all the previous moves
leading to the current subgame.
This completes the description of the durable monopoly game. The
situation envisaged by Coase [1972] can be represented by setting b-
exp(-r0), p - exp(-RD), r ~ 0, R 1 0, where 0- 1~T is the length
of market days, and considering the limit as T approaches infinity, such
that the overall time horizon stays TO - I.
3. FINITE TIME I30RIZON
The focus of this section is to derive two major results on the durable
monopoly game with a finite time horizon. First it will be shown that
generically (or under a certain refinement of subgame perfection) there8
exists a unique equilibrium path of the durable monopoly game. Second
the limiting behavior of the equilibrium outcome for 0- 1~T -. 0 will
be studied.
The technique of the proofs rests on two cornerstones. The fust,
Lemma 1, describes a property of all subgame perfect equilibria of the
gaine: It says that, under very weak conditions, for each period t the set
of still active consumers along the equilibrium path is an interval with
lower bound zero and an upper bound which is decreasing over time.
The second cornerstone is a sequence of recursively defined coeflzcients,
the properties of which will be described in Lemmas 2 and 3. Since the
proofs of these two Lemmas require lengthy induction arguments, the
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Concerning the first lemma, there will be two notions used which re-
quire clarification. R,ecall that the strongest notion of Nash-refinements
is a atrict equilibrium, i.e. a Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium
strategy of each player is the unique best response to the equilibrium
strategies of the other players. In games with a continuum of players this
is perhaps too much to ask for. Under perfect information an infinite ac-
tion space of a single player already results in infinitely many subgames
and thus in infinitely many pure strategies for all players. Combined
with a continuum of players this can result in unavoidable indifferences:
Even in the one-shot monopoly game with a continuum of potential cus-
tomers, there will always be one customer, who is indifferent between
buying and not buying. For this class of games it is, therefore, natural to
weaken the notion of a strict equilibrium and to require that equilibrium
strategies are unique best responses along the equilibrium path for all
players except, possibly, for a null set of players. For the situation at
liaiid we call a Nash equilibrium ~trict along the equiliórium path with
reepect 2o almo,rt all playera (SPAAP), if the equilibrium strategy com-
bination assigns a unique (payoff-) maximal move at each information
set reached along the equilibrium path, given the equilibrium strategies
of the other players, to all players except for a closed set of potential
customers with (Lebesgue-) measure zero. Observe that this definition
implicitely assigns positive mass to the monopolist.
The second notion in Lemma 1 which requires specification is that the
Lemma states that its conclusion applies "generically" to all subgame
perfect equilibria of the durable monopoly game. Such a notion is usu-
ally best defined by stating, when a property is "non-generic". We will
say that some property of the game is non-generic, if it is possible to
find a continuous (cumulative) distribution function on the unit interval
(the set of possible consumer valuations) which is arbitrary close to the
uniform distribution (say, in the supremum-norm), but which destroys9
the property (if it is substituted for the uniform distribution).
1.4ost of the notation will be developed, where it ia needed. For the
time being, let, for any given subgame perfect equilibrium o, the set of
consumers v E(0, 1~, who are stiU active in period t along the equilibrium
path induced by o (because a prescribes that they do not buy before
period t, unless a deviation occurs), be denoted by V~(o) C[0, 1~. (The
symbol "int" will assign the interior of a set.)
LEMMA 1. For any subgame perfect equilibrium o which is strict along
the equilibrium path with respect to almost all players (SPAAP) and
generically for all subgame perfect equilibria o of the durable monopoly
g~e,
int Vi(o) - (0, v~(o)),
with vl(o) - 1, and 0 C vttl(o) C vt(o) G 1, for a11 t- 1,... , T- 1.
PROOF: For some given subgame perfect equilibrium o let p(o) E~}t,
p(a) -(p~(a),..., pT(v)) denote the sequence of prices induced along
the equilibrium path. Denote by (o-,,, wi) the strategy combination
induced by o in the subgame after in period t a consumer v, who was
supposed to buy in t under o, has deviated to waiting, v E Vi(o).
Consider some v E V~(o), who in equilibrium does not buy in period
!(at the price pi(o)). For this v E V~(o) it must either be true that
v G p,~k(o), d k- 0, ..., T-t, or there must exist some k- 1, ..., T-t,
such that
v- pi(a) C bk(v - pett(a))
b v G pe(o) - ákPrt,t(o)
1-6k
Consequently, for all v' G v, v' E V~(o), either v' G p~~k(o), 'dk -
0, . , T - t, or
v, G Pe(a) - bkPetk(a)
1-bk
4-:-~ v' - pe(o) G ák(v~ - Petk(~)),
for at least one k- 1, ..., T- t. We wish to show that in period t all
v' G v will not buy in equilibrium either. Suppose some v' G v dces buy
in period t according to a. Then v' G pe(o) is impossible, and it must
be true that there exists some k- 1, ..., T- t such that
0 C v' - pe(a) G ók(v~ - Petk(a)),
and v' - P~(o) ? b~(v - Peti((o-n', we))),io
for all 1- 1, ..., T- t. But these two inequalities imply
Pett((a-~~, we)) 7 Pitk(a)
for at least one k- 1, ..., T- t. Since (a-„~, w~) differs from a only by
an individual dcviation (of mass zero), the sequence of residual demands
( Jyr~e~ dv);-t, viz. the mass of all still active consumers, on which the
monopolist's pricing decisions are based (by subgame perfection), re-
mains unchanged by the deviation. Hence, that for some k fwo prices
can be subgame perfect equilibrium choices (in the subgame), implies
that in period t~- k the monopolist has two distinct best responses to
the consumers' equilibrium strategies. This certainly contradicts the re-
quirement that the equilibrium satisfies SPAAP. Thus consider subgame
perfection without the strictness requirement: Since the monopolist's
profit function of period t f k always contains a term of the form
PrtkJ dv ,
v~t.(o)~(r~t.,ll
the property that the monopolist has two distinct best responses can
always be destroyed by choosíng a slightly different distribution function
of consumers close to the uniform (twist in on V~tk(o), where the one-
period profit is quadratic in pi~k under the uniform distribution).
Iterating this argument backwards from t - T-1 to t- 1 shows that,
if v E V~(a) does not buy in period t, then any v' G v will not buy either
for all t- 1, ..., T, under the two alternative hypotheses of the Lemma.
It follows that V~}1(o) is an interval, if Vt(Q) is an interval, such that
intViti(s) - (infVr(a), m~k-i,...,T-ePs(o)
i 6~kfk(a)),
for all t - I,..., T- 1. Now clearly, V~(o) -[0, 1), vl(u) - 1,
infVifi(o) - infVi(a), imply infVt(o) - 0, for all t - 1,... , T, and
veti(~) - suPViti(o) G supVi(o) implies 0 C vsti(o) G vi(o) G 1, as
required. Of course, this was derived under the assumption that not all
v E V~(Q) buy in period t in equilibrium. If they do, then Vitl(o) - 0,
vitl(o) - 0, verifies the claim of the Lemma. ~
Subgame perfection enters the proof of Lemma 1 in an essential way,
because it is required to keep the monopolist from threatening with
"punishment" price choices which are not or not generically best re-
sponses at the corresponding information sets. A short comment on the
notion of a generic game, as used above, may be appropriate here also:11
The reader may wonder, why "non-generic" was defined in terms of the
distribution rather than, say, in terms of discount factors. The reason
for this is simply that discount factors have no role to plsy in the final
period t - T. And although one could presumably apply similar argu-
ments in terms of discount factors for any period t G T, this does not
rule out the possibility that the monopolist has two best responsea in
the final period. ( Strictness along the equilibrium path with respect to
almost all players, SPAAP, of course, rules this out immediately.)
The next ingredient to the analysis is an, at this stage, purely formal
definition of a sequence of ccefficients. Fix some T, 1 C T G oo, and
define recursively the sequence (at)i1 of coefFicients by
at -(1 - ó f zaett)~
, aT - 1,
1-ëf(z-4)aefi
for t - 1,... , T- 1 and for 6 E (o, 1) and p E (0, 1). The properties of
these coefficients are given in the next two lemmas, the proofs of which
can be found in the Appendix.




Using these coefficients now define the sequence of linear functions
(Fi)ii, F~: ~2tt ~ ~ft, bY
Zai
F~(P) - á p .
1-ó~-za~
LEMMA 3. If P-(Pi,..., PT) E~~} satisSes ps - Fe(Pi-1), tlt -
2,..., T, then
(i) pe-i - áp~ ~ pi-z - ópt-1 t1t - 3 T~ 1-ó 1-ó ' ,..., ~
Pe - ókPetk Pe - ókttPefkti




This completes the preparations and allows us to atate the main The-
orem.12
TxEOREM 1. The durable monopoly game has, for any fixed, finite
T, a unique subgame perfect equílibrium outcome which is strict along
the equilibrium path with respect to almost all players (SPAAP). The
SPAAP-equilibríum outcome generically coincides with the only sub-
game perfect equilibrium outcome of the game. This unique outcome
can be characterized as follows:
(i) In any period t- 1, ..., T-1 all consumers, who have not yet bought
in any previous period r G t and have a reservation value v E~0, 1) sat-
isfying
v ~ p` - óFiti(Pe)
1-b
will buy in period t, and all consumers, fot whom the above strict in-
equality is reversed (G) will wait. In period t - T all consumers, who
have not yet bought and have a reservation value v~ pT will buy, and
all consumers v G pT will not buy.
(ii) The monopolist will in any period t- 2, ..., T set a price pr -
Fr(pr-i ) rrnr! will in lrrri.rrl f- l.~rt thr pri~~ pr -- 1ni.
PROOF: The idea of the proof is to invoke Lemma 1 which generically
resp. under SPAAP allows us to use vi(v) - sup Vi(o) as a state vaziable,
and calculate the equilibrium by backward induction. Thus the proof is
constructive and uniqueness is guaranteed by Lemma 1.
Let t- T. Clearly by subgame perfection applied to the last subgame
of period T, any v 1 pT, v E VT(a), will buy and any v G pT will not
buy. Thus the monopolist's problem in the first subgame of period T is
to choose pT such as to maximize
~T - PT inax i0, vT(o) - PT~.
The first order condition of this problem reads for vT(a) 1 pT
vT(v) - 2pT - 0
~ PT - 2vT(o) - 2aTVT(o) S vT(o),
with second order condition -2 C 0. Such a choice yields a profit of
nT(vT(o)) - 4vT(a)Z - 4aTVT(O)2 ~ 0
which is strictly larger than zero, if vT(o) ~ 0, and thus a unique best
response. In period t- T-1 for all consumers v E VT-1(o), who satisfy
„ ~ PT-i - ápT
1-6 '13
it is the unique best response to buy in period t- T- 1, and for all
v E VT-1(v), who satisfy
v G ~-t - ópT
1-ó
it is the unique best response to wait. Due to the rational expectations
of all consumers one must have,
6
PT-1 -bpT PT-1 - ZyT(Q) - PT-1
vT(o)- 1-á - 1-6 1-6~2 ~0
which in turn implies
t a
PT - 1~ b~2 - 1- á~ zaTPT-1 - FT(PT-1).
This verifies the monopolist's pricing rule for t- T and vT(a) ~ 0.
The above implicitely defines the value function of the monopolist for
period T by
i s ia
nT(PT-1) - (14 Pb,z)z - (1 - á-} ~aT)sPz'-i .
Now assume that for some t ~-1 G T one has along the equilibrium path
Potk(a) - F etk(Pttk-1), dk - 1,..., T- t, and
~aeft z 1 2
~étt(Pe) - (1 -Áf Zasft)~Pe
- 4asttveti(o)
as the value function for the monopolist's profits from period t f 1 on-
wards. Consider the last subgame of period t, where consumers v E
Vi(o) decide, given pt. F~om the induction hypothesis pt}1 - Frtt(Pe)
are rational expectations, and it follows that for any v E V~(a), who
satisfies
v~ pe - bFitt(Pe)
1-b
it is the utvque best response to buy in period t at pt, because
pe - bFtft(Pr) , Pr - bkPefk
1-é 1-ák14
for all k- 2, ..., T-t, from Lemma 3, (ii), and the induction hypothesis.
For any v E Vt(o), who satisfies
v ~ Pt - 6Fltl(Pe)
1-ó '
it is a best choice not to buy at the price pt, but rather wait for at least
t f 1. Thus
vett(o) -
Pt - áFttl(Pt) - Pt
1-ó -1-6fZaetl
Consequently, the monopolist's problem in the first subgame of period t
is to choose pt such as to maximize
Pt 4att1 y




- Pev!(o) - (1 - 6 f zaetl)~
P! - Prve(a) - at ,
if this quantity is larger than what can be obtained from p! ~ v!(a).
The first order condition for this problem is -
vt(o) - ZPt - 0
a!
with second order condition -2~at G 0 by Lemma 2, (ii). Such a choice
yields a profit of
~i(vt(a)) - 4aeve(v)2
and a price pt of
Pt - 2aevt(a) C vt(a)
as the unique best response, by Lemma 2, (ii). In order to see that the
monopolist does not have an incentive to set p! ~ vt(o), observe that, if
he does, then vttl(o) - vt(o) implies
~t(vt(Q)) - P~itt(vetl(o)) - P~itl(vt(o)) - 4attlv!(a)~15
such that
paettve(a)Z ~ (1 - ó t zattt)~ve(o)~
4 4(1 - ó t( ~ - 4)aett)
, ó a. 6 ,
~ paett li - ó t( 2 - 4)atttl G(1 - á-t- Zaett )
s
b p(1 - ó)aett f p(2 - 4)aétt C(1 - ó)~ f a(1 - ó)aett f 4aitt
é~ é '
b 0 G(1 - ó)~ t(ó - P)(1 - ó)attt t( 4- 2 ~- 4)aétt
b o C~1 - a f( 2- 2)atttlZ ,
by Lemma 2, (i). By the same argument as above, the consumers'
optimal behavior in the last subgame of period t- 1 yields




xi (Pt-t) - (1 - 6 f zat)~Pi-t
verifies the value function for period f. Also this verifies
i
Ps - 2aevt(v) - 1- Á-~
aatPt-t - Fe(Pt-t) -
s
This completes the induction argument. All that remains to be shown
is vt(o) ? vttt(o). But this follows from
vs(o) - Pe-t - áPt ) Ps - bpttt
1-ë 1-ó -vttt(a),
Pr - Fr(Pe-t), and Pttt - Fttl(pt), and Lemma 3, (i). This completes
the verification of the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.
Observe that the equilibrium constructed above is one, where all play-
ers play their unique best choices against the equilibrium strategies of
the other players at all information seta reached by the equilibrium
path, except for the finitely many consumera, who satisfy v- vt(o),
for some t - 1, ..., T. Since finitely many points in the unit interval
have (Lebesgue-) measure aero, this equilibrium satisfies SPAAP and16
thus its outcome (up to the behavior of the finitely many indifferent
consumers) is unique by Lemma 1, as required by the Theorem. ~
The equilibrium constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 displays the
following recursive properties:
(1) Pe(a) - Zaeva(a) - Fe(Pe-i(o)), Pi(o) - 2ai ;
(2) vi(o) - pt-i - (1 - ó f Zai)vt-t(o)
v o 1;
1-áfza~ 2(1-óf(Z-4)ai)' 1( )-
i . a
(3) xi(o) - 4arv~(o)~ - 1- b f t-1(a) a ' ~,
o-~.
(z - 4) e
t( )
Once the sequence of coefficients (ai)~1 is calculated, equations (1)-(3)
allow a simple calculation of the three important variables of the game:
prices, active consumers, and profits (along the equilibrium path). Since
the ai's only depend on T, it is possible to write pt(T), vt(T), and ai (T)
instead of using o as the argument. Observe from (1) that prices always
decrease over time, because
1 ó
Zaicl-ó-}-zai t~ aiC2,
from Lemma 2, (ii).
Theorem 1 reveals, why the traditional wisdom that the monopolist
has to price competitively, because his own agents of different periods
compete against each other, does not hold in the present setting: The
Bertrand-type competition of the monopolist's agents across periods is
an artefact of stating the problem in an infinite horizon in the first place,
rather than considering the limit of the solution for finite T (where T is
the number of subperiods in a time interval of fixed unit length), when
the grid on a finite time interval becomes infinitely fine, as assumed by
the original Coase-Conjecture. When the limiting solution for finite T
is studied, T-~ oo, agents do not compete as fiercly anymore, because
the possibilities of a precommitment increase over time: The agent in
the last period has, by subgame perfection, no other option than be-
having as a one-shot monopolist against the remaining set of still active
consumers. Because rational expectations obtain in equilibrium, the mo-
nopolist's agents of period T- 1 know that the agents of period T are
commited to do so, and can, therefore, determine the optimal residual
demand in T by choosing a higher price pT-1 than pT. This structure
unravels backwards. The consequences of this are that, as there are more
subperiods, the monopolist's overall profit more and more approaches17
the profit he gains, if he waits for the last period, where he behaves
monopolistically.
The next proposition pins down, what these remarks suggest. Let now
the time horizon be normalized to 1 and consider the durable monopoly
game in T subperiods of length 0- 1~T such that ~T - 1 ia the overall
titne horizon. Tlie appropriate discount factors are now given by
á- e-rn,
P- e-RO, r 1 0, R~ 0.
Although players do almost not discount from one subperiod to the next,
they do discount over the entire time horizon from t- 0 to t- 1, when
0~ 0, and their time preference may differ.
PItOPOSITION 1(ANTI-COASE-CON]F.CTURE). If ~ -. 0, i.e. T ~ oo,
then
~~(0) - limo-.oai(lI~) - e-R~4 ~ 0.
PROOF: Rewrite the definitioa of the sequence of coefficients (at)T t as
(1 - e-rn ~ 2 e-~oat-rntn)~
at-.v -
1- e-.o ~( 1e-r0 - ~e-RO)at-retn ~ s ~
for all r - 1, ..., T- 1. Then
at - 1,
at-r~tG - a1-rG 1 -.n e-r0 e-R~ t Q - Q[1 - e f(2 - 4)at-.otoJ- x
rG e-r~ e-~ x[(1 - e- t( 2 - 4)at-Totn)at-rofo-
e-~n
- (I - P-rn } 2at-fotn)zJ-
Taking limits, using L'Hospital, yields
(1 - e-'y)a f ( `-z a - `-4 a )az - (1 - e-rn ,{- `-z a a)s
limp-.o Q( 1 - e-~a } (e-~o - e-11e )a)
4 4
re-ro ~-RA
limn-.o[re-roa -( 2 - 4 )a~ - 2(1 - e'.n~
-t-e 2aa)re-~o(1-2)Jll-e-~nf(e 2a - e 4a)af
-.o ~tn
f0(re-rn -
( re2 - Re4 )a)J-' - Ra,18
such that á(t) - Ra(t), a(1) - 1. This differential equation has the
solution a(t) - exp{Rt - R}. This implies from (3) that ~r'(0) -
limp,o~ri(1~0) - a(0)~4 - e-R~4, as required. ~
It is of some interest to calculate the limiting paths for prices and the
sets of active consumers. 1'rom (1) the pricing equation can be written




Peoto -Peo - 2atoto - (1 - e-~n } ~e-~oatnto)
p - 0(1 - e-.n .~ ze-.natotn) Peo -
This yields, again usíng 1'Hospital, from
z- 1 f e-.o - ~-2' a -.n } ~~-.e a
-re limo-.o ~(1
- e-.n } e~ o a)- hmo,o 1- e-~o ,~ ~ 2 o a-
- r(1 - 2~a) G 0, a E(0, 2),
the differential equation p(t) - r[1 - 2exp{R - Rt}]p(t), with initial
condition p(0) - exp{-R}~2, which has the solution
(4) P(t) - 2 exp{rt - ReR(1 - e-Rt) - R}.
Observe that the more patient the monopolist is (the smaller R is)
the higher prices are, as intuition suggests. But also, the more pa-
tient consumers are (the smaller r is), the higher prices are, because
Rt G 2eR(1 - e-Rt), b't E(0, 1]. Thus consumers, who do not mind
waiting, make it easier for the monopolist to let prices drop more slowly.
By an analogous procedure as for prices, one obtains from (2) that
(1 -e-~o f ze-'oatntn)vto
vtnto - 2(1 - e-.o ~ (e-~n~2 -
e-ROI4)atoto)
implies
yt~t~ - Vtp - ZC-~~ - Z- 4C-~DatOtA f 4E-RAatOt~
~ - ~(1 - e-~n f(e"o~2 - e-Rn~4)atnto)
ven ,
yielding again with the help of 1'Hospital
i e-ro - i ie-~oa } ie-Rna
limo~o 0~1 - e-.n~~. (e-~o~Z - e4Ro~4)a) - r- R- 2r~a G -R,19
if a E(0, 2), such that v(t) -[r- R- 2r exp{R - Rt}]v(t), with initial
condition v(0) - 1 yields
(5) v(t) - exP{(r - R)t - ReR(1 - e-Re)}.
Note that v(t) will always satisfy v(t) E(0, 1), `dt E(0, 1], because
v(0) - 1 and v(t) G 0. Since v(1) ] 0 there will always remain a non-
empty set of unsatisfied consumers, and - depending on r and R- this
set may even be larger than in the one-shot game (this will for example
be the case, if ln(2) ~ R and r G[2(eR -1) - R]-1 [R(ln(2) - R)] holds).
A comparison of equations (4) and (5) showa that prices are always
lower than they would be in a sequence of one-shot monopoly games
against the remaining set of consumers:
p(t) - 2eR~~-~~v(t), `dt E (0, 1].
From this it follows that, if the monopolist becomes very impatient,
R--~ oo, then the Coase-Conjecture obtains, because not only do all
prices converge to zero, but also ~r'(0), the monopolist's overall profit,
approaches zero. This is so, because, only if the monopolist is very
impatient, there will be true competitive pressure from his own agents
of future periods, who contribute - in thia special case - nearly nothing
to the payoff of the monopolist's agent in the initial period t- 0.
If only r~-~oo, then consumers are so impatient that the monopo-
list's agent of the initial period t- 0 plays against the vast majority of
consumers like a one-shot monopolist. Since for all t E(0, 1]
t- ReR(1 - e-R~) G 0 b Rt G 2eR(1 - e-R~)
is implied by
Rt-O-2eR(1-e-R`) b t-0
and the derivative inequalities (with respect to t)
R G 2ReR~1-~~ e~ 1 G 2eR11-`~, bt E[0, 1],




with p(0) - e-R~2 1 0. Thus very impatient consumers make the
monopolist set strictly positive prices initially which will rapidly drop20
towards 2ero, but not sufficiently rapid to leave a noticeable part of
consumers holding out for later stages of the game.
Equation (4) also implies that
-R
lim~~o p(t) - e 2 , b't E[0, 1],
such that very patient consumers, r~ 0, correspond to the case, where
the monopoliat manouvers himself really into the position of a one-shot
monopolist in the terminal period by insisting on the same price for all
periods. Still, however, equation (5) shows that v(t) - e-R', such that
consumers buy sequentially.
The fïnal case that can be inferred from equation (4) is the case of a
very patient monopolist, R~ 0. In this case
-Ri
limRyo
1 -Re - IimR~o te-Ri - t
implies that p(t) - Ze-r~ and equation (5) implies for R y 0 that
v(t) - e-~t, and one has a'(0) - 1~4, the one-shot monopoly profit.
Thus the case of a very patient monopolist corresponds to a"sequential
monopoly" in the sense that each period t looks like a one-shot monopoly
game with a set of consumers Vt -[0, e-'t]
As general conclusions one obtains that very patient consumers induce
nearly constant prices, while a very patient monopolist induces p(t) -
zv(t), a "sequential monopoly".
4. INFINITE T1ME I~ORIZON
In this section we will study the resulting equilibria of the infinite
game which are approximated by solutions to finite games, keeping time
preference parameters and the length of sales periods fixed. This is the
ca.se, for linear demand functions, covered by Gul et.al. [1986]. The
more general approach with respect to 6 and p presented here sheds a
new and surprising light onto the analysis by Gul et.al..
To study the case T- oo is interesting beyond the purpose of illus-
trating that it makes a difference how limits aze taken. The case T- o0
is one, where two different specifications of the demand side become in-
distinguishable. We have assumed that, independently of the period t
in which consumer v buys the durable, she always derives utility v(in
terms of our initial example: she is happier by v for the rest of her life
after having seen the exhibits once). If the consumer would rent the
durable at price pt for one period and renting is only possible as long
as the monopolist is active, then her utility from renting the durable21
from period t onwards depends on the remaining time horizon [as, for
example, in Bulow, 1982]. When in such a world with a finite overall
time horizon the length of subperioda becomes arbittarily small, then
the economy's total surplus is driven to zero towards the end of the time
horizon (even if nobody has bought yet). Thus such an economy oper-
ating within a nnite time interval has a built-in bias towards Coasian
outcomes, because its total surplus shrinks over time independently of
time preferences. When T- oo, this cannot happen and the rental
durable goods market becomes equivalent to the scenario with a fixed v
independent of t. Thus we now turn to exploiting equations (1)-(3) for
the case, where T approaches infinity, by applying aaymptotic conver-
gence, i.e. by selecting as a solution to the infinite game the limit of the
solution to finite games.
What drives the solutions to the finite games are the sequences of
coefficients a~, described in Lemmas 2 and 3. As a first step towards
the analysis of the game with T- oo it will now be shown that for
each given pair of discount factors (Á, p) the a~'s have a unique limit as
T--~ oo for all (á, p) E [0, 1]~.
LEMMn 4. When T approaches infinity, then for any finite t the value
of the coefficient ai appmaches
a(á, P) - 2(1 - á)
1-6f~'
The mapping (À, p) ~ a(á, p) is a continuous function on (0, 1]2 `
{(1, 1)}, but has a discontinuity at (á, p) -(1, 1), where a(1, 1) - 1.
PxooF: Define the function cp: [0, 2] ~(0, 2] by
~P(a) -
(1 - á f za)s
1-át(z - 4)a ,
such that the coefficients at from the finite games are implicitely defined
by a difference equation of the form
ak - ~p(ak-1), ao - 1 ,
where k is just the reverse índexing as the one with t, taking t - T
as the starting value, k- 0. Observe that cp(0) - 1- á E[0, 1] and
~p(2) - 2~(2 - p) E[l, 2]. In the proof of Lemma 2 it has been shown
that the derivative ~p'(a) ~ 0, `da E(0, 2). Since ~p is continuous on22
[0, 2], it has at least one fixed point by Brouwer's fixed point theorem.
Any fixed point of ~p must satisfy a- ~p(a) which results in




Now assume a- 2(1 - ê)~(1 - ó-~~ and a E[0, 2] for (ó, p) E
(0, 1]2 `{(1, 1)}. Then one must have 1-6 1~ and simultaneously
1- b C 1- 6-~ which, however, is impossible. Thus ~p has only




Since the fixed point is unique for all (ó, p) E (0, 1]~ `{(1, 1)}, the
derivative of ~p at the fixed point must satisfy cp'(a(ó, p)) G 1. Then a
simple phase diagram argument shows that any sequence ak - y~(ak-1),
ao - 1, converges to a(ó, p) as k-. oo. This proves the first part of the
Lemma.
Clearly a(ó, p) is a continuous function in (ë, p) for all (ó, p) E [0, 1J2 `
{(1, 1)}, such that it remains to study the behavior of a(ó, p) at (ó, p) -
(1, 1). If (ó, p) -(1, 1), then the function cp becomes the identity. Thus,
although any value a E[0, 2] now yields a fixed point of ~p, the only fixed
point which satisfies the initial condition is a- 1. ~
Lemma 4 sheds considerable doubt on the claim by Gul et.al. (1986,
p.173] that a uniform discount factor for both the monopolist and the
consumers is not an essential restriction. If the point (ë, p) -(1, 1) is
approached along the diagonal, p(D) - ó, then the limit ofa(ë, p) as ó j 1
is a(1, 1) - 0. And this special way of approaching the point (1, 1) in
fact explains, why Gul et.al. obtain a Coase-Conjecture, as can be seen
from the proof of Theorem 2 below. On the other hand, the only solution
at (Á, p) -(1, 1) which satisfies asymptotic convergence has a(1, i) - 1
and, therefore, a positive overall profit of a~(o) - limT-.~ai(T) - 1~4
equal to the one-shot monopoly profit. This happens, because the map-
ping assigning equilibrium outcomes which satisfy asymptotic conver-
gence has a discontinuity at this point. However, in the course of prov-
ing Theorem 2 below we will show that much more can be sustained at
(ó, p) -(1, 1) by other equilibria. Let again ~ri(o) denote the monopo-
list's overall profit in an equilibrium o.
THEOREM 2("FOLK THEOREM"). Consider the infinite horizon game
with T- oo and ~ixed discount factors (ó, p) E (0, 1]2. Piclc any number23
~r E(o, 1~2). Then there exists a continuous path {ó(s), p(s)},E~~,
wíth 6: 9?t -. (0, 1), p: Jtt -. (o, 1), and with lim,~a,ó(s) - 1-
]im,.-.,op(s) such that for any pair of discount factors 6 and p in the
closure of this path, (ó, p) E(~),E~~(ó(s), p(s))) U{(1, 1)}, there exists
an equilibrium which yields the monopolist a payoff
~i(o) - ir.
In particular, any payoff ir E(0, 1~2) is an equilibrium payoff at (ó, p) -
(1, 1).
PROOF: First assume (ó, p) -(1, 1). By restating the proofof Theorem
1 within an infinite time horizon it can be shown that any á E(0, 1~2)
can be supported by a suitably chosen equilibrium as the monopolist's
overall profit: Since under ó- 1 any consumer v? pi will be indifferent
between buying now or later, given that she expects constant prices
across all future periods, the value of vi can be chosen freely within
an interval with lower bound pi - p. Since under p- 1 the monopolist
does not care in which period profits are made, a constant price sequence
can freely be chosen from an interval with upper bound vi - v. Since
the ratio of (constant) prices to the (also constant) vi's is arbitrary
(within the unit interval), this construction allows to generate any profit
~i(o) E (0, 1~2).
Observing that for all (b, p) E [0, 1JZ `{(1, 1)} Lemma 4 yields an
equilibrium with ~r~(o) - a(ó, p)~4 by equation (3), one can construct
an equilibrium payoff correspondence
~1-6~
if p6 C 1,
(6) ~i(ó, P) - 1-6t i-a'
[0, 1~2J , if p6 - 1,
which is continuous on [0, 1Jz. Now choose a path (ó, p): ~t~ -~ (0, 1)~
such that for all s E 82t
P(s) - 1 - [(2~ - 1)(1 - ó(s))J2
for some ir E(0, 1~2) and lim,~,o6(s) - 1- lim,~,op(s). Clearly the
above equation defines a contour set (iso-profit-curve) of the correspon-
dence ~r~(Á, p) such that
~ri(ó(s), P(s)) - x, ds E~2~ U{oo},
because
ap(s) - aZp(s) - 1
lim,-.ooaó(s) - o and aó(s)z --2(2ir -
1)2 C o.24
From the definition the limit of ~ri (ë(s), p(s)), when s~ oo, also equals
á. ~
What Theorem 2 says is that, for any equilibrium profit of the monop-
olist between almost nothing and almost all the surplus of the economy,
there is a one-dimensional manifold in the plane of discount factors along
which this profit will be sustained by the equilibrium outcome satisfy-
ing asymptotic convergence. Moreover, each of these iso-(equilibrium)-
profit curves ends at the point (á, p) -(1, 1), where everything is pos-
sible. This resembles a Folk Theorem, despite the fact that the durable
monopoly with an infinite time horizon is not a supergame. On the
other hand Theorem 2 differs from a Folk Theorem, because for any
interior pair of discount factors it assigns a unique equilibrium payoff.
Its main message is that everything in the infinite game depends on the
relative patience of the monopolist versus potential customers. If p- 1
and 6 E[0, 1), then rri(o) - 1~2 and by perfectly price-discriminating
against consumers the monopolist extracts all the surplus. If b- 1 and
p E [0, 1), then the opposite is true, ni(o) - 0. This is the case of the
Coase-Conjecture, where the consumers' greater patience forces the mo-
nopolist's agents to compete against each other. If (b, p) -(0, 0), then,
~ri(o) - 1~4, the one-shot monopoly profit results. At (á, p) -(1, 1)
any number á E(0, 1~2) can be supported as an equilibrium payoff to
the monopolist. Although the equilibrium correspondence (6), used in
the proof of Theorem 2, is constructed such as to be continuous, the re-
action of equilibrium payoffs to slight parameter variations in the vincity
of (á, p) -(1, 1) is dramatic.
An outside observer of different durable monopoly markets with very
patient players may see radically different profits of the monopolist
across markets, even if the discount factors look almost the same. But,
if this observer takes finitely many observations of prices on each maz-
ket, she will also see almost constant price sequences on each market,
although at very different levels. This is so, because Lemma 4 yields for
any finite t that at - a(á, p) such that equation (1) yields
y ( P) Pi-i Q 1a á, ( )
Pe(a) -




Thus, for p sufFiciently close to 1, the equilibrium price sequence will be
almost constant for all finite t and will, therefore, depend on pl(o) -
a1~2 - a(Á, p)~2. Consequently, the choice of á(in a neighbourhood25
of 1) will determine the level of the almost constant sequence {pi(o)}i
by determining the level of pt(a) - a(ë, p)~2. This observation shows
that close to (ó, p) -(1, 1) there is no tendency whatscever for prices
to drop quickly - contrary to what a Coasian intuition would suggest.
How can these findings be recoaciled with the results by Gul et.al.
[1986]? It was already ntentioned ihat, when the point (ê, p) -(1, 1) is
approached along the diagonal, ó- p, then the monopolist's equilibrium
profit approaches zero. On the other hand there is this set-valuedness at
this point in (6) (where the function assigning asymptotically covergent
equilibrium payoffs had a discontinuity), cloae to which payoffs vazy dra-
matically with parameters. Still there is a sense in which the operation
of assigning the Coase-Conjecture to the limiting point (ó, p) -(1, 1)
can be viewed as robust. The reason for thia robustness is a fundamental
asymmetry in the durable monopoly game which, at least azound the
point (ó, p) -(1, 1), manifests itself in the result stated next:
PROPOSiTION 2(LOCAL COASE-CONJECTURE). Consider any twice
continuously differentiable function p: (-oo, 1] -a [0, 1] whirh satisfies
p(1) - 1. Then
limó.-.t~i(ó, P(ó)) 1 0
implies that the derivative of p with respect to 6 at the point 6- 1 is
zero, p'(1) - 0.
PROOF: From p(ó) E [0, 1] and p(1) - 1 it follows that p'(1) ~ 0. 5ince
p(1) - 1, 1'Hospital has to be used to calculate the limit of equation (6),
~(1 - ó) 1 - p(ó)
lima-t - lima-.t
1- ó-}- 1- p(ó) p'(é) ~ 2 1- p(é)
Clearly, if this limit is strictly positive, then p'(1) ~ 0 is impossible, such
that p'(1) - 0 follows. ~
The significance of Proposition 2 is the following: Whenever the point
(ó, p) -(1, 1) is approached along a path (ó, p(Á))all, p(1) - 1, and the
limit of ~i(ó, p(á)) is taken along this path, then any path which has
p'(1) ~ 0 will yield ~i(1, 1) - 0, the Coasian outcome. Only paths
(Á, p(ó))átt which locally, in first order approximation, look like the
"edge" U6E~o,t)(ó, 1) of (ë, p)-space will yield a positive limiting profit
to the monopolist.
This does nof inean that any aequence {(óa, pk)}ht, with (ón, Pn) E
(0, 1)~, (bti, pw) ~h-,a, (1, 1), which is close to the diagonal in some
metric (on the space of sequences) will generate the Coasian outcome. A
metric on the space of sequences will simply not be able to discriminate26
between the slopes p'(1) which are necessary to apply 1'Hospital. What
Proposition 2 states is much weaker: It says that in a topology which
discriminates between slopes p'(1) of differentiable paths the operation
of assigning a unique value to xi(1, 1) is continuous, only if the value
assigned is zero. In this sense Proposition 2 is indeed a"very" local
result. The limit operation which assigns the Coasian outcome is robust
only in a topology which is of an order finer than information on how
the values of p and ó relate to each other. If data is only available on
the values of p and Á, then such a limit result requires information that
cannot possibly be obtained by the analyst.
Still this puts the Coase-Conjecture as demonstrated by Gul et.al.
[1986] into the correct theoretical perspective: Locally in first order ap-
proximation it looks aa if the monopolist would have to be infinitely
more patient than consumers to be able to extract a positive share
of the surplus. Of course, globally the picture is much less extreme:
Since the contour set of ~ri(ó, p) - 0 from equation (6) is the "edge"
(JoElp ~~(1, p) of the space of discount factors, it globally takes con-
sumers, who aze infinitely more patient than the monopolist, to estab-
lish the Coase-Conjecture. Proposition 2 only shows that there is a weak
sense in which the assignment of the Coasian outcome to the extreme
point (ó, p) -(1, 1) can be viewed as a robust limit operation (in a
sufficiently fine topology).
The intuitive reason that allows for a"Local Coase-Conjecture" in
the spirit of Proposition 2 is the following asymmetry in the durable
monopoly game: When all players aze very patient, then each potential
customer looses very little by holding out to take advantage of future
price cuts. If the monopolist, on the other hand, tries to hold out by
letting prices drop only very slowly, then this will cost her more, because
to be able to credibly do so, she will have to stazt out with low prices in
the first place.
The general conclusion on infinite durable monopoly games is, how-
ever, that the relative patience of consumers versus the monopolist de-
termines "who eats whom in the durable goods monopoly" [to quote
from von der Fehr and Kuhn, 1990]. Extremely patient consumers
will enforce almost competitive outcomes. A very patient monopolist
will perfectly price discriminate. If both parties are very myopic, then
prices start out high and drop fast, approximating the outcome of the
one-shot monopoly. If both parties are very patient, prices drop very
slowly, but how they start out is basically indeterminate - with a local
tendency in favor of the Coase-Conjecture.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present paper has explored the generic equilibria of a durable
monopoly market with a very special (linear) demand function, but with
both finite and infinite time horizon and with possibly asymmetric time
preferences for the monepelist and potential customers.
The Coase-Conjecture within its original setting (Coase, 1972~, i.e.
within a finite time interval divided into infinitely many small subpe-
riods, does not hold true. It takes an extremely myopic monopolist to
establish that the monopolist's equilibrium profit will be almost zero.
The main resson for this result is that with bounded time preference
parameters and a finite horizon the monopolist's ability to control the
incentive structure of his own future agents increases over time, even if
the length of sales periods is very small.
The picture is altered, once the finite time horizon is given up. If the
number of possible sales periods is infinite, but discount factors (and
the length of sales periods) remain fixed, then for very patient players
a result which resembles a Folk Theorem holds: Although asymptotic
convergence will still select a unique equilibrium for the boundary case
(6, p) -(1, 1) (with a payoff to the monopolist equal to the one-shot
monopoly profit), therc are other equilibria in the limit in which every-
thing is possible. The relative time preïerence in fact determines wtiether
a Coase-Conjecture will hold in the infinite game or whether the mo-
nopolist will almost perfectly price discriminate against consuiners, thus
extracting all the surplus. With possibly asymmetric time preferences
the Coase-Conjecture, as demonstrated by Gul et.al. (1986], thus turns
out to be a special case, generated by assuming symmetric time prefer-
ences. Still there is a local argument in favor of the conclusion drawn
by Gul et.al.: With extremely fine information the Coasian outcome can
be made a robust limiting outcome. The only drawback which this limit
has is that it does not satisfy asymptotic convergence.
These results suggest that, if the monopolist has the opportunity to
commit to closing down her operation after some finite time horizon,
then she has an incentive to do so. Also, if the monopolist would be
able to commit to longer sales periods, by having an employee doing
the transactions after having set the price for the week herself, say, then
such a commitment will make the monopolist better off. This, after all,
may be the reason, why in our initial example we saw an agency selling
the tickets to the exhibition, rather than the company that provided the
exhibits.
It is unlikely that the technique of the present analysis can essily
be generalised to more general forms of demand functions like the ones28
used by Gul et.al. [1986]. Still the arguments of Lemma 1 suggest that
qualitatively our conclusions will hold true for all distributions of the
consumers' valuations in a neighbourhood of the uniform distribution.
Given the negative flavor that comes with an Anti-Coase-Conjecture and
a Folk Theorem, a non-degenerate simple example should be sufl'icient
to make the point. Beyond this, the richness of phenomena generated by
our model may serve as a guidance for future research using more general
demand functions, but also more structure concerning time preferences.
APPENDIX
PaooF oF LEMMn 2: Let t- T; then aT - 1, such that 1- ó f 6~2 -
1- b~2 1 p~2 ~ p~4 and 0 C aT - 1 c 2 hold. Then, in order to apply
induction, assume that
, b p
(i ) 1- b f Zaitl ~ 4atf1,
b ~ P (ii ) 1- b i- 2aiti 1 Zarti,
r (iii ) 0 G aifl G 2.
Then (i') implies at ~ 0. From
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)(1-áf2a)[4(1-2)af4(1-b)J )~
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it follows that (iii') impliea
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from the above, which implies
1-á~-(2-2)a~12(1-p)ae~0 ~
~ 1-á}2ae12ai~4ae.
as required in (i). ~
PROOe oF LEMMn 3: (i) From pi - Ft(p~-1) one has
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1- 6 t zai-1 1- ó f zai -(1 - 6 f za~)(1 - 6 f zai-1)
À 1
e-~ 1 -b~-2at 1 2at-1 .







which is the fust part of Lemma 2, (i).
(ii) The definition of FL implies that
k-~ yat}k-i
Pe}k -~ á P~, dk- 1,..., T- t,
i-a 1- b f zat}k-i
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can equivalently be written as
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The latter inequality will now be demonstrated by induction. Let k- 1;
then
~
21 - á t 2aetl ~ 1- bz f 2aetz ~
attl 1- b.} zattz
2(1 - d)(1 - b f ( 2- á)attz] f 6(1 - b i- 2attz~z
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which is the first part of Lemma 2, (i). Next assume
M
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.
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This implies
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because the second (weak) inequslity is equivalent to
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which, again, follows from the first part of Lemma 2, (i). ~
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